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Critical Discussion

Wittgenstein and Derrida, by Henry Staten; xxviii &
182 pp. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984,
$19.95.

Discussed by Michael Fischer

Wittgenstein and Derrida, the subjects of Henry Staten's important
new book, have met before in contemporary literary theory, usu-

ally, however, as enemies or at least as philosophers with antithetical approaches to language. In several articles and at greater length in Act and
Quality (1981), Charles Altieri, for example, has found in Wittgenstein a
powerful challenge to Derridean literary theory, while Christopher Norris

in The Deconstructive Turn (1983) has argued that Wittgenstein's writings
are infected with the skeptical doubts that they supposedly cure. Unlike
these critics, Staten proposes allying Wittgenstein with Derrida, an effort
that depends on contesting what I would call, following Staten, the "com-

munitarian" or "therapeutic" reading of Wittgenstein and the "terrorist" or
"nihilist" reading of Derrida. While Staten complicates these familiar
readings, he does not bring about the realignment that he seeks. Even
after his painstaking work, the Derridean notions that he grafts onto Wittgenstein still seem out of place.
Staten sees Derrida as a critic of a metaphysical tradition inaugurated

by the Greeks and extended by such modern philosophers as Husserl.
Much of Staten's introduction ("From Form to Différance"), first chapter
("The Opening of Deconstruction in the Text of Phenomenology"), and
concluding chapters (grouped under the heading "The Law of Identity

and the Law of Contamination") review Derrida's by now familiar
deconstructive critique, sympathetically going over such terms as spacing,
trace, iterability, and différance. As an explicator of Derrida, Staten can be
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94Philosophy and Literature

repetitious, especially toward the end of the book. And he can be unfair to
some of Derrida's critics, especially John Searle, whose frequently discussed response to "Signature Event Context" seems to Staten not simply
"vacuous" but lazy: "But no matter how traditional or well-entrenched die
view, it remains that Derrida has worked out a critique and an alternate
structure that he claims has a greater range and power, and it is easier to
reassert the canonical concepts he criticizes, as Searle has done, in total ig-

norance of the full range of die conceptual structure Derrida has worked
out as its replacement, than it is to master his arguments and his new logic
and then to show where they fail" (p. 127). (In a similarly irritated tone,
Staten rebukes Searle's essay "The Logical Structure of Fictional
Discourse" for its "absurd posturing.") Dividing the world between the
hard-working critics who agree with Derrida (thereby demonstrating that
they understand him) and the indolent critics of deconstruction who more
or less naively reassert what Derrida criticizes has reduced the debate on
deconstruction to an often boring shouting match.
Finally, in writing about deconstruction, Staten adopts its worst stylistic
traits: ungainly verbs ("separate off" instead of separate, "open out" instead of "open," "normed," and "unlids" are only a few examples); labyrin-

thine sentences ("The iterability of a code ruptures its authority because it
makes it essentially permeable to the deformations of context and yet
makes it independent of the power of any given context to determine its
meaning once and for all, because the sign carries an irreducible structure
that will not let itself be absorbed into a present intention that would fix it

in relation to an intentionally totalizable present context" [p. 123] is a mild
example); and Francophile idioms (e.g., "To think an essential law of contingency, as Derrida does, is to generalize as a 'grammatical rule' the principles of the kind of critique diat Wittgenstein here instantiates" [p. 18]).
These shortcomings, however, are the other side of Staten's strengths,

in particular his enthusiasm for the ideas he is discussing and his refusal to
simplify complex texts. His patient, detailed treatment of Speech and
Phenomena, a work often passed over by literary critics, is especially good.
Instead of setting up Husserl as a straw man whom Derrida can easily
knock down, Staten shows that rigorously working through Husserl's

work is a precondition for deconstructing it. His evenhanded commentary persuades me not only diat Derrida is a careful reader of Husserl but
that Husserl may have been right in thinking that phenomenology completes die project begun by Greek philosophy.
As mentioned earlier, in order to align Derrida widi Wittgenstein,
Staten has to overturn the still popular image of Derrida as a freewheeling
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anarchist. Staten's commentary accordingly proceeds along the following
lines: (1) According to Staten, Derrida questions such supposedly
metaphysical notions as identity, completeness, "object-talk," intention,
wholeness, seriousness, order, reference, essence, unity, presence, and

consciousness. (2) But, while Derrida questions these terms, he is not
refuting, destroying, or denying them (as many opponents of deconstruction have charged). (3) Instead, Derrida is merely (or only) modulating,
resituating, displacing, suspending, unsettling, or complicating these
terms in order to release the presumably exciting new possibilities

philosophers since Plato have repressed. In brief, for Staten "it is not a
question of giving up idealization [or metaphysics] , but of modulating it,
of allowing it to open out onto some possibilities that have not been conceivable under the old formulas" (p. 24). (See also pp. 47-48, 152, 155,
among many other references tiiat I might cite.)

This is a sophisticated reading of Derrida, which is not to say that it is
free of problems. I would argue that Derridean critics cannot have it botii
ways: the same argument that belitdes the fear of antideconstructionists
(that chaos has come again) also undermines the hope of some prodeconstructionists (diat significant change is about to occur). In the
scheme that I have just oudined, the dismissive, nothing-to-worry-about

tone of step (2) defuses die liberationist, new-age-about-to-dawn rhetoric
of step (3): hence the irredeemable vagueness of the possibilities that
Staten celebrates.1

I am less interested here in the implications of Staten's approach to Derrida dian I am in die problems it poses for his attempt to group Derrida
with Wittgenstein. To bring out Wittgenstein's resemblance to Derrida,
Staten has to chip away at die familiar image of Wittgenstein as a

dierapist who answers philosophical questions by appealing to shared
forms of life or ordinary language-games, where philosophical concerns
presumably never arise. Against diis view, Staten points out in his second
chapter ("Wittgenstein Deconstructs") that the rules of these games are not
inflexible guidelines forever ruling out change, variation, and uncertainty.
In Wittgenstein, Staten remarks, we follow these rules like "a blind man

feeling his way with his stick . . . constrained by die accidental [as opposed to the essential or ontological] at every turn" (p. 94). The absence of
any firm boundary around our concepts exposes them to endless probing,
"since it is impossible to tell in advance where this questioning should stop"
(p. 158), where seriousness, for example, turns into nonsense.

Staten is right to suggest that Wittgenstein and Derrida thus overlap in

challenging the rigidity, or what Staten wants to call die "superhardness,"
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of identity, essence, and the other "metaphysical" terms mentioned earlier.
Nevertheless, from this starting point it seems to me that Derrida and

Wittgenstein take different paths. Derrida, as Staten astutely reads him,
speaks of contaminating or infecting metaphysical categories with the im-

purities that diey try to exclude. From Derrida's point of view, for instance, "'Repeatability,' as the condition for the existence of all idealities,
whether they are the 'senses' or real or ideal objects, turns out to infect the
entire domain of presence" (p. 50). (See also pp. 52, 63, and 84 for much

the same metaphor.) Similarly, perforating the boundaries of the self
allows (or forces) it to be "inimitably torn and carried away into an illimitable spread of new contexts" (p. 147). On the way to selfhood, in this
view, we "fall" into a "perverse activity of invention, of fictionalization,
Erdichtung" and disintegration that leaves us only with "accidental transfor-

mations of related assemblages of inessentials" (pp. 85-86). In diese

deflating comments, Derrida (or Staten) is not so much bringing us down
to earth as rubbing our noses in it, as in something unsavory.
For Wittgenstein, instead of dispersing or scattering the self, the
allegedly perverse activity described by Staten constitutes the self. Inven-

tion and so on characterize how humans acquire their identity, not how
they lose it. I would make much the same response to the other examples
taken by Staten from the Investigations. Reading, for instance, is not in-

fected but shaped by "what is not reading" (pp. 83-84). Similarly, when
we extend a mathematical series, learn a language, bring words home, or
follow a rule, our stumbling describes how we carry on instead of annul-

ling our progress. In each case Wittgenstein uses contingency, variability,
and temporality not to sully traditional philosophical categories but to
humanize them. Derrida's demystification-with-a-vengeance thus gives
way to a probing that reaches bedrock in what we (humans) do (Philosophical Investigations, §217).
I do not want to exaggerate die neatness of this resolution, as if Wittgenstein had in mind comfortably setding down and not the hard,
frustrating work of digging until, as he says, "the spade is turned." Like
Derrida, Wittgenstein is always wary of the possibility of dogmatism, of
our confusing getting tired with reaching bedrock. Even so, from Wittgenstein's point of view, digging can arrive at firm ground as well as break it

up. Giving grounds — like testing, explaining, teaching, and reading —
thus comes to an end somewhere but that end is what Wittgenstein calls in
On Certainty "an ungrounded way of acting" (§110). As Stanley Cavell has
put it in "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy,"
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We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected,
and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts.
Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the
grasping of universale nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing

insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on
the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling,

modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and of fulfillment,
of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what
forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when
an explanation — all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls "forms of
life." Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon
nothing more, but nothing less, than this.2

The "nothing more" in this formulation always provides an opening for
skepticism, the "nodiing less" a way of containing, though never
eliminating, skeptical doubt.
While Staten recognizes some differences between Wittgenstein and

Derrida, he minimizes them, only belatedly admitting in his conclusion
that "the deconstructive moment of Wittgenstein's writing is not the whole
story" (p. 156). I agree with diis concession, tiiough in my view it strains
the alliance that Staten has been trying to forge. In calling Wittgenstein's

later work "consistently deconstructive" (p. xvi), Staten properly emphasizes Wittgenstein's interrogating the invariable essences and fixed

rules that have held traditional philosophy — and some of Derrida's
critics — captive. But Staten loses sight of the constructive lesson that Wittgenstein went on to affirm: "essence is expressed by grammar," not
perverted by it (Investigations, §371).
University of New Mexico

1 . I develop this argument at much greater length in my Does Deconstruction Make Any
Difference? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), Chapters 5 and 6.
2.Stanley Cavell, "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Must We Mean
What We Say? (1969; rpt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 52.

